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Abstract
Many elements of culture made their first appearance in
the Upper Paleolithic. Previous hypotheses put forth to
explain this unprecedented burst of creativity are found
wanting. Examination of the psychological basis of
creativity leads to the suggestion that it resulted from the
onset of contextual focus: the capacity to focus or
defocus attention in response to the situation, thereby
shifting between analytic and associative modes of
thought. New ideas germinate in a defocused state in
which one is receptive to the possible relevance of many
dimensions of a situation. They are refined in a focused
state, conducive to filtering out irrelevant dimensions
and condensing relevant ones.
Introduction: A Cultural Revolution
Human culture is widely believed to have begun
between 2 and 1.5 mya, at which time a rapid increase
in brain size coincides with onset of the use of fire and
sophisticated stone tools. The archaeological record
suggests that a perhaps even more profound cultural
transition occurred between 60,000 and 30,000 ka
during the Middle / Upper Paleolithic (Bar-Yosef,
1994; Klein, 1989; Mellars, 1973, 1989a, b; Mithen,
1996, 1998; Soffer, 1994; Stringer & Gamble, 1993;
White, 1993). Leakey (1984) writes:
Unlike previous eras, when stasis dominated, innovation is
now the essence of culture, with change being measured in
millennia rather than hundreds of millennia. Known as the
Upper Paleolithic Revolution, this collective archaeological
signal is unmistakable evidence of the modern human mind at
work (p. 93-94).
Mithen (1996) refers to this period as the 'big bang' of
human culture, claiming that it shows more innovation
than the previous six million years of human evolution.
It marks the beginning of a more strategic style of
hunting involving specific animals at specific sites. We
also see the colonization of Australia, the replacement
of Levallois tool technology by blade cores in the Near
East, and the first appearance of many forms of art in
Europe, including naturalistic cave paintings of
animals, bone and antler tools with engraved designs,
ivory statues of animals and sea shells, personal
decoration such as beads, pendants, and perforated
animal teeth, and elaborate burial sites. Some of these
items are associated with social change and the
beginnings of ritualized religion; White (1982) writes of
a “total restructuring of social relations” (p. 176).
Moreover, we see the kind of cumulative change that
Tomasello (1999) refers to as a Ratchet Effect.
What could have caused this unprecedented explosion
of creativity? Some have noted that it would make
things easier if this second cultural transition also
coincided with an increase in brain size (Mithen, 1998;
Richerson & Boyd, 2000). And in fact, human brain
enlargement does seem to have occurred in two spurts.
However, the second takes place between 500,000 and
200,000 (Aiello, 1996) or 600,000 and 150,000 ka
(Ruff,  Trinkaus, & Holliday, 1997); at any rate, well
before the Upper Paleolithic. Thus the cultural
revolution cannot be directly attributed to a change in
the size or shape of the cranium. Leakey (1984) writes
of anatomically modern human populations in the
Middle East with little in the way of culture, and
concludes ÒThe link between anatomy and behavior
therefore seems to breakÓ (p. 95).
Existing Hypotheses
Let us review some of the explanations for the Upper
Paleolithic Revolution that have been put forth.
Advent of Syntactic Language
It has been argued that while a primitive form of
language, or proto-language may have existed earlier,
the symbolic and syntactic aspects emerged at this time
(Aiello & Dunbar, 1993; Bickerton, 1990, 1996;
Dunbar, 1993, 1996). Another argument put forth is that
prior to the Upper Paleolithic, language was used
merely in social situations, and thereafter it became
general-purpose, put to use in all kinds of situations
(Aiello & Dunbar, 1993; Dunbar, 1993, 1996).
These arguments lead to the suggestion that the
Upper Paleolithic Revolution was due to onset of more
complex language. As noted by Tomasello (1999),
language has a transformative effect on cognition.
However, to posit that the cultural revolution is due to
the attainment of sophisticated language begs the
question: what cognitive change made possible the kind
432
of thought that sophisticated language requires? And
unless there was a underlying cognitive change
involved, why did the cultural situation change so
rapidly? Thus the riddle of the Upper Paleolithic is not
resolved through the attainment of complex language.
Material Culture as Externalized Memory
Donald’s (1991, 2001) explanation is that material
culture began to function as an externalized symbol
storage. Certainly artifacts serve the purpose of
anchoring knowledge or desirable states of mind so that
they can be referred back to later. One sees a depiction
of bison on a cave, and there is a re-living of the
experience of watching a stampede of bison. One looks
at notches in a log and knows how many days have
gone by. The result is not so different from retrieving
knowledge from memory, though the source of the
knowledge is external rather than internal.
However, the external world functioned as a form of
memory long before there were symbolic artifacts. A
look of disapproval on a mother's face could remind a
child not to eat a poisonous mushroom as readily as
retrieval of a memory of doing this and getting sick.
The look on the mother's face is not a material artifact,
yet it functions for the child as an external memory
source, in much the same way as a bison painting or
notches in a log. Moreover, since material objects are
manifestations of ideas, which begin in minds, it seems
reasonable that we look to the mind, not the outside
world, for the root cause of the cultural revolution.
Exploration of Conceptual Spaces
Another possibility is that it reflected an enhanced
ability to blend concepts (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002)
or to map, explore, and transform conceptual spaces
(Mithen, 1998).  Mithen refers to Boden’s (1990)
definition of a conceptual space as a ‘style of
thinking—in music, sculpture, choreography,
chemistry, etc.’ As for why hominids suddenly became
good at exploring and transforming conceptual spaces,
he is somewhat vague:
There is unlikely to be one single change in the human mind
that enabled conceptual spaces to become explored and
transformed. Although creative thinking seems to appear
suddenly in human evolution, its cognitive basis had a long
evolutionary history during which the three foundations
evolved on largely an independent basis: a theory of mind, a
capacity for language, and a complex material culture. After
50,000 years ago, these came to form the potent ingredients of
a cognitive/social/material mix that did indeed lead to a
creative explosion (p. 186).
Mithen may be on to something with the notion that the
cultural revolution is related to the capacity to explore
and transform conceptual spaces. However, although
the capacity for a theory of mind, language, and
complex artifacts may have, in their most primitive
forms, arisen at different times, it is hard to imagine
how they could have evolved independent of one
another. Furthermore, if there is anything that science
has established in the last decade or two it is that a
single, small change in initial conditions can have
enormous consequences (e.g. Bak, Tang, & Weisenfeld,
1988; Kauffman, 1993). Thus the possibility that the
Upper Paleolithic revolution can be explained by a
single change in cognitive functioning is not only the
simplest explanation, it is also consistent with the
sudden transition in the archeological record, and with
our understanding of phase transitions across the
scientific disciplines.
Connection of Domain-Specific Modules
Many suggest that modern cognition arose through the
connecting of domain-specific brain modules, stressing
in particular that this would allow for the production of
analogies and metaphors (Fodor, 1983; Gardner, 1983,
1993; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Rozin, 1976; Sperber,
1994). Mithen (1996) suggests that in the Upper
Paleolithic, modules specialized to cope with domains
such as natural history, technology, and social processes
became connected. However, this would require that
there be space enough for not just the modules but the
new connections amongst them, and as we have seen,
this cultural transition does not coincide with an
increase in size or change of shape of the cranium.
Moreover, the logistics of physically connecting these
modules (whose positions in the brain evolved without
foreknowledge that they should one day become
connected) would be formidable.  Sperber’s (1994)
solution is that the modules got connected not directly,
but indirectly, by way of a special module, the ‘module
of metarepresentation’ or MMR, which contains
‘concepts of concepts’. However, to invent an artifact
that combines information from different domains, such
as an axe with a bison engraved on it, it is not necessary
that the module that deals with tools be connected to the
one that deals with animals, nor even that the concepts
‘axe’ and ‘buffalo’ spend time together in a meta-
module. All that is necessary, as explained shortly, is
that these concepts be simultaneously accessible.
Psychological Basis of Creativity
We have looked at several hypotheses to account for
the cultural revolution of the Upper Paleolithic. Each
has merit, but none provides a satisfying explanation for
this burst of creativity. To determine more precisely
what gave rise to the modern human mind, it is useful
to examine the psychological basis of creativity.
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Attributes of Creative Individuals
Martindale (1999) identified a cluster of attributes
associated with high creativity. A first one is defocused
attention: the tendency not to focus exclusively on the
relevant aspects of a situation, but notice also seemingly
irrelevant aspects (Dewing & Battye, 1971; Dykes &
McGhie, 1976; Mendelsohn, 1976). A related attribute
is high sensitivity (Martindale, 1977, 1999; Martindale
& Armstrong, 1974), including sensitivity to subliminal
impressions; stimuli that are perceived but of which one
is not conscious of having perceived (Smith & Van de
Meer, 1994).
Creative individuals also tend to have flat associative
hierarchies (Mednick, 1962). The steepness of one’s
associative hierarchy is measured by comparing the
number of words generated in response to stimulus
words on a word association test. Those who generate
few words for each stimulus have a steep associative
hierarchy, whereas those who generate many have a flat
associative hierarchy. Thus, once such an individual has
run out of the more usual associations (e.g. ‘chair’ in
response to ‘table’), unusual ones (e.g. ‘elbow’ in
response to ‘table’) come to mind. The evidence that
creativity is associated with both defocused attention
and flat associative hierarchies suggests that creative
individuals not only notice details others miss, but these
details get stored in memory and are available later on.
However, a considerable body of research suggests
that creativity involves not just the ability to defocus
and free-associate, but also the ability to focus and
concentrate (Barron, 1963; Eysenck, 1995; Feist, 1999;
Fodor, 1995; Richards et al. 1988; Russ, 1993)1. As
Feist (1999) puts it: “It is not unbridled psychoticism
that is most strongly associated with creativity, but
psychoticism tempered by high ego strength or ego
control. Paradoxically, creative people appear to be
simultaneously very labile and mutable and yet can be
rather controlled and stable” (p. 288). He notes that, as
Barron (1963) put it: “The creative genius may be at
once naïve and knowledgeable, being at home equally
to primitive symbolism and rigorous logic. He is both
more primitive and more cultured, more destructive and
more constructive, occasionally crazier yet adamantly
saner than the average person” (p. 224).
Phases of the Creative Process
How do we make sense of this seemingly paradoxical
description of the creative individual? The evidence that
creativity is associated with both defocused free-
association and focused concentration is in fact
                                                           
1There is also evidence of an association between creativity
and high variability in physiological measures of arousal such
as heart rate (Bowers & Keeling, 1971), spontaneous galvanic
skin response (Martindale, 1977), and EEG alpha amplitude
(Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978; Martindale, 1999).
consistent with the idea that the creative process
consists of a generative phase followed by an
evaluative phase (Boden, 1991; Dennett, 1978). Indeed
there is an enduring notion that there are two kinds of
thought, or that thought varies along a continuum
between two extremes (Ashby & Ell, 2002; James,
1890/1950, Johnson-Laird, 1983; Neisser, 1963; Piaget,
1926; Rips, 2001; Sloman, 1996). Although the issue is
still a subject of hot debate, the general picture
emerging is as follows. At one end of the continuum is
an intuitive, associative mode conducive to finding
remote or subtle connections between items that are
correlated but not necessarily causally related. This
mode may yield an idea or problem solution, though
perhaps in a vague, unpolished form. At the other end
of the continuum is a rule-based, analytic mode of
thought, conducive to analyzing relationships of cause
and effect. This mode facilitates fine-tuning and
manifestation of the creative work.
Contextual Focus Hypothesis
Let us now now look at a tentative explanation of the
cognitive mechanisms underlying the creative process
(Gabora, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Gabora & Aerts, 2002).
We take as a starting point some fairly well-established
features of memory. According to the doctrine of neural
re-entrance, the same memory locations get used again
and again (Edelman, 1987). Each memory location is
sensitive to a range of subsymbolic microfeatures
(Smolensky, 1988), or values of them (Churchland &
Sejnowski, 1992). Location A  may respond
preferentially to lines of a certain angle (say 90
degrees), neighboring location B respond preferentially
to lines of a slightly different angle (say 91 degrees),
and so forth. However, although location A responds
maximally to lines of 90 degrees, it responds to a lesser
degree to lines of 91 degrees. This kind of organization
is referred to as coarse coding. The upshot is that
storage of an item is distributed across a cell assembly
that contains many locations, and likewise, each
location participates in the storage of many items
(Hinton, McClelland, & Rummelhart, 1986). Items
stored in overlapping regions are correlated, or share
features. Therefore memory is content addressable;
there is a systematic relationship between the state of an
input and the place it gets stored. Thus episodes stored
in memory can thereafter be evoked by stimuli that are
similar or ‘resonant’ (Hebb, 1949; Marr, 1969).
Let us consider the significance of this memory
architecture for creativity. To be constantly in a state of
defocused attention, in which relevant dimensions of a
situation do not stand out strongly from irrelevant ones,
would be clearly impractical. It is only when one does
not yet know what are the relevant dimensions—or
when those assumed to be relevant turn out not to
be—that defocused attention is of use. After the
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relevant dimensions have been found it is most efficient
to focus on them exclusively. Indeed it has been shown
that in stimulus classification tasks, psychological space
is stretched along dimensions that are useful for
distinguishing members of different categories, and
shrunk along nonpredictive dimensions (Nosofsky,
1987; Kruschke, 1993). In ALCOVE, a computer
model of category learning, only when activation of
each input unit was multiplied by an attentional gain
factor did the output match the behavior of human
subjects (Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky & Kruschke,
1992). Thus learning and problem solving involve both
(1) associating stimuli with outcomes, and (2) shifts in
attention that determine how one ‘parses’ the space. Let
us refer to the situation in which many stimulus
dimensions or aspects of a situation activate memory to
an almost equal degree as a flat activation function, and
the situation in one focuses exclusively on one stimulus
dimension, or aspect of a situation, as a spiky activation
function. We can refer to the ability to spontaneously
adjust the shape of the activation function in response to
the situation at hand as the capacity for contextual
focus.
Let us now explore the possibility that creative
individuals are not always in a state of defocused
attention, but that they can enter this state when useful
(such as in a word association test). Thus when one
encounters a problem or inconsistency, or seeks self-
expression, one enters a state of defocused attention
conducive to associative thought through a flattening of
the activation function. More diverse memory locations
get activated and provide ingredients for the next
thought. Because of the distributed, content-addressable
structure of memory, a seemingly irrelevant element of
the situation may evoke an episode from memory that
shares this element. The connection between them may
inspire a new idea.
The vague idea generated in a defocused state is
clarified by focusing attention on the new connection
and shifting to a more analytic mode. The activation
function becomes spikier, and the region searched and
retrieved from narrower. This continues until, to use
Posner's (1964) terms, one has filtered out the irrelevant
dimensions and condensed the relevant ones.
In sum, it is proposed that the capacity for contextual
focus is the distinguishing feature of the modern human
mind, and the reason for the cultural revolution of the
Upper Paleolithic.
Why Connected Modules  is Not Necessary
Let us see why to blend items from different modules
together it is not necessary that they be connected. Once
modules start encoding more of the richness of their
respective domains, to the extent that these domains
have elements in common, an individual will start to
have experiences that activate multiple modules
simultaneously. Let us say, for instance, that Mithen is
right about natural history and social situations being
the domain of different modules.  Both these modules
will come to contain memory locations that respond to
the chaotic, volatile elements of a situation. So, for
example, an individual in a volatile mood might remind
one of stormy weather. Thus the modules themselves
need not be connected for a blend to occur so long as a
situation can simultaneously activate them.
Possible Explanation for Lag Between Brain
Expansion and Cultural Revolution
An increase in brain size provides more storage space,
thus memories can be laid down in richer detail. But it
doesn't follow that this increased space could
immediately be navigated in the most efficient way.
This is particularly the case for situations involving
simultaneous activation of multiple modules; there is no
reason to think their contents would be compatible
enough to coexist in a stream of thought. The stormy
individual might prompt one to take shelter without
leading to the without realization that ones' own mood
could take on this stormy quality. A situation where
three apples reminds one of ones' three children could
prompt one to bring home the right number of apples,
without leading to the realization that 'three-ness' can be
independent of apples or children. It seems reasonable
that it took time to fine-tune the cognitive system such
that items from different domains could be blended
together and recursively redescribed in a coordinated
manner. Only then could the full potential of this large
brain be realized.
Summary and Discussion
The period of history that exhibits the most impressive
cultural transition is the Upper Paleolithic. To gain
insight into what caused this unprecedented explosion
of creativity, it is useful to examine the creative
process. Creative individuals are prone to states of
defocused attention, and tend toward flat associative
hierarchies, suggesting a proclivity for associative
thought. However, creativity involves not just an
intuitive, associative mode of thought, but also an
analytic, evaluative mode. This suggests that creativity
requires the ability to shift between these modes.
Thus it is tentatively proposed that the arrival of art,
science, religion, and likely also complex language and
a restructuring of social relationships in the Upper
Paleolithic was due to the onset of contextual focus: the
capacity to focus or defocus attention in response to the
situation, thereby shifting between analytic and
associative modes of thought. New ideas germinate in a
defocused state in which one is receptive to the possible
relevance of many dimensions of a situation. They are
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refined in a focused state, conducive to filtering out
irrelevant dimensions and condensing relevant ones.
Contextual focus is not a matter of more memory, but
of a more sophisticated way of using memory; thus the
proposal is consistent with there being no increase in
brain size at this time. It is consistent with a point made
by Bickerton (1990) and Leakey (1984) that brain size
cannot be equated with intelligence. However it
deviates from Bickerton's perspective in that it is not
language per se that made the difference, but rather a
kind of cognitive functioning that made not only
language possible, but all aspects of group survival that
can benefit from being considered from different
perspectives and at different degrees of abstraction. It
does not require that modules be connected, but merely
simultaneously accessible.
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